here should I go for my next vacation? Which novel should I read next? Most choices people make are about 'matters of taste' , on which there is no universal, objective truth. How can people increase their chances of selecting options that they will enjoy? One promising approach is to tap into the knowledge of others who have already experienced and evaluated the available options. The recommender systems community has leveraged this source of knowledge to develop collaborative filtering methods, which estimate the subjective quality of options for people who have not yet experienced them 1, 2 . One key insight from this field is that, because tastes differ, building recommendations based solely on the evaluations of individuals similar to the target individual often improves the quality of the recommendations 3 ; similarity is typically defined as the correlation between the ratings of options evaluated by both the target and another person. Although the consumer industry enables people to benefit from recommender systems in some domains (for example, choosing a movie), for many everyday decisions, neither algorithms nor 'big data' are conveniently available. Thus, it remains unclear how individuals can best leverage the experience of others when they share previous experience about the available options with only a relatively small community of peers. Should they use strategies that aggregate the opinions of several other individuals or is it better to rely on the opinions of just a few similar others?
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Although most everyday decisions are about matters of taste, there has been relatively little study of the precise social learning strategies that people can use to inform their decisions. On the one hand, descriptive research in social, consumer and developmental psychology has shown that people are swayed more by the opinions of similar individuals than by those of less similar others [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] . However, this literature has generally not emphasized precise, formal models of social learning: what exactly are the strategies that people can use? Should everybody use the same strategies and, if not, what are the crucial factors determining which strategy works best for whom and why? On the other hand, descriptive and normative research on social learning, advice taking and judgement aggregation in the fields of cognitive science, judgement and decision-making, anthropology and biology is rife with formal models of social learning. However, with a few exceptions [11] [12] [13] , these models are about matters of fact, where there is an objective ground truth [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] . In this article, we go beyond the small body of literature on strategies for social learning about matters of taste [11] [12] [13] in three ways. First, we undertake an exercise in theory integration by capitalizing on the striking conceptual similarities between seminal recommender system algorithms and both (1) models of judgement and categorization and (2) models of social learning and social decision-making about matters of fact. More specifically, we recast the latter two classes of models as social learning strategies for matters of taste. Second, guided by this mapping, we use simulations to investigate how ordinary people with limited experience could use different strategies to leverage the experience of others and therefore make better decisions about matters of taste. To this end, we examine the inevitable trade-off between harnessing the apparent (dis)similarity between people's tastes-to discriminate between more and less relevant people-and estimating those similarities accurately enough on the basis of limited shared experience (that is, the number of options both the decisionmaker and the others in the community have experienced). Third, we explore how this trade-off plays out for different individuals depending on how similar their tastes are to those of the other people in the population (for example, for people with mainstream versus alternative tastes).
Mapping recommendation algorithms and strategies
Only a handful of studies have formalized and explored social learning strategies for matters of taste, in which people use the experiences of others to make predictions about their own future taste experiences, and the conditions under which different strategies thrive or fail. Yaniv et al. 11 studied experimentally the conditions under which people give more weight to the expressed preference of a similar individual than to that of a group of randomly sampled individuals; in a simulation study with synthetic data, the authors demonstrated the prescriptive appeal of these two simple strategies. Müller-Trede et al. 12 investigated the conditions under which people can benefit from taking the advice of a crowd of similar or randomly chosen individuals, as opposed to focusing on the opinion of just one other individual, sampled either at random or on the basis of similarity. They studied theoretically how people can leverage the advice of several similar others to predict their own future taste experiences and corroborated their predictions using data on people's preferences for music and short movies. Finally, Gershman et al. 13 proposed a model in which people rely on the revealed choices of other individuals to infer the latent preference groups to which these individuals belong and then use this information to weight the opinions of similar others. In a series of experiments, the authors observed a good correspondence between their model and human behaviour.
Here, we formalize several social learning strategies for matters of taste and study the extent to which applying these strategies would lead people to choose experiences they will enjoy. We started by identifying conceptual similarities between early recommender system algorithms and models that are typically applied to predicting matters of fact-that is, where people have access to either informational cues that are potentially related to an objective criterion (for example, using the number of movie theatres in a city to predict its population size) or social cues (that is, the opinions of others on the same objective criterion). We used this correspondence to recast these models as social learning strategies for matters of taste-some of which were inspired by seminal algorithms from recommender system research-that can be used to predict an individual's future evaluations of an option based on the past evaluations of others.
In the following, we illustrate some of the strategies using the example of deciding which movie to watch based on other people's ratings. This fictional dataset (see Table 1 ) has the same structure as the large-scale datasets used in recommender system research and in our own study below. Sofia likes superhero movies and wants to decide whether to watch Batman or Fantastic Four. Her friends have already seen both movies. She and her friends have all watched and evaluated several other movies. From Sofia's perspective, her own future taste experiences are the criterion values she seeks to predict, and her friends' evaluations are cues she can use to predict them. Sofia can leverage the options that she and her friends have evaluated in the past to assess her taste similarity with them (see also refs [4] [5] [6] 9, 11 ), defined as the Pearson correlation between her past evaluations and the evaluations of her friends. Sofia thinks that she and Bob have similar tastes, as they have expressed exactly the same tastes about three options. If Bob truly were her 'taste doppelgänger' , she could simply imitate his evaluations and arrive at accurate estimates of her own future enjoyment (the doppelgänger strategy; see Table 2 ). However, it is unclear to what extent this apparent similarity-based on just a small set of shared past experiences-will generalize to future cases.
Thus, Sofia may also prefer to take other people's evaluations into account. One approach would be to assign equal weights to all individuals and simply use the average evaluation (that is, the 'mainstream' opinion; whole crowd strategy, see Table 2 ). However, that would also incorporate the evaluations of individuals with possibly very different-or even antithetical-tastes (for example, Lou's ratings seem to be negatively correlated with those of Sofia). To avoid this problem, Sofia could instead rely on the opinions of a select few similar people, such as Bob and Linda (clique strategy; see Table 2 ) or people whose tastes are at least minimally similar to hers (and therefore exclude Lou; similar crowd strategy; see Table 2 ). Alternatively, she could assign weights to people's opinions in proportion to their similarity to hers (similarity-weighted crowd strategy; see Table 2 ). Finally, she could search for movies that the others rated similarly to Batman and for movies that they rated similarly to Fantastic Four. In line with models of similarity-based inference in cognitive science 22, 23 , she could then weight her past evaluations of these proxy movies according to their similarity to the target and choose the one that shows the highest promise (similar options strategy; see Table 2 ; for example, Spider-Man could serve as a proxy movie for Batman).
The social learning strategies (in Table 2 ) can be placed on a continuum between strategies that rely solely on similarity information and strategies that rely solely on a simple aggregation of opinions irrespective of similarity. Strategies in between those two end points put more or less weight on aggregation or similarity, respectively. The mapping reveals groupings and conceptual similarities between the strategies. For example, although the whole crowd, clique and doppelgänger strategies rely on similarity information to a different extent, all three strategies can be seen as instances of the k nearest neighbour algorithm from the recommender system literature 24 ; this algorithm relies on a single parameter k to determine the number of the most similar individuals whose opinions will be aggregated. Crucially, for some of the combinations of strategy and research stream, we could not find any examples in the literature. For instance, the similar crowd strategy has been implemented in the recommender system literature, but it has not yet been studied as an informational or social cue-based strategy in other domains. Likewise, the similar options strategy corresponds to exemplar models and nearest neighbour models from the informational domain and to item-item algorithms in collaborative filtering, but it has not yet been studied in the social-cue domain. These unexplored strategy-domain combinations illustrate the usefulness of theory integration in identifying blind spots in extant scientific paradigms.
When should social learning strategies excel?
The performance of strategies using either informational or social cues to predict matters of fact (see Table 2 ) has been studied extensively in cognitive psychology, forecasting and machine learning [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] . There are two important insights from these normative investigations. First, the amount of data that is used to train a given strategy is crucial for its performance. Strategies that rely on accurate estimates of many parameters require a decent amount of data before they start paying off 25, [30] [31] [32] . Second, the performance of any strategy depends on the structure of the task environment in which it is applied. Two key factors that typically affect the performance of strategies are the mean correlation between cues and the criterion value (that is, the mean cue-criterion correlation) and the dispersion across those cue-criterion correlations 25, 33 . Strategies assigning equal weights to all informational cues or averaging the opinions of many individuals tend to perform relatively well when the mean cue-criterion correlation is high and the dispersion in the predictive power of cues is low 25, 30, 34 . Single-cue strategies, which rely only on the seemingly most important cue, tend to perform well relative to more complex strategies when Sofia is the target individual trying to predict which movie-Batman or Fantastic Four-she will enjoy more based on the ratings of five friends. The movies are rated on a scale ranging from 1 to 5; higher values indicate more positive reviews. This prediction challenge is the same both for recommender system algorithms that rely on collaborative filtering, which predict a user's taste by considering the ratings of all other users, and for humans who try to predict their own future taste experience based on the experiences of their peers. Some key differences between the two domains are the amount of data available and the respective computational demands: recommender system algorithms operate on very large matrices with thousands of users and items and can do calculations effortlessly, whereas humans are constrained by the limits of their social network and their bounded cognitive capacities.
NaTUre HUMaN BeHaviOUr (1) there is a high correlation between the criterion value and the cue deemed most important and (2) this cue is correlated with the other cues, implying that it already captures the predictive information contained in the additional, less predictive cues 25, 28, 30, 35 . Strategies that rely on a few very good predictors or assign different weights to predictors fall in between averaging and single-cue strategies. Those strategies are expected to perform better as the dispersion in the predictive power of the cues in the environment increases because it is easier to identify highly valuable predictors and forecasters 25, 36, 37 and differential weighting can profit from differences in the predictive values of the cues 30 .
In the domain of taste, each individual's taste can be seen as a unique criterion value that he or she seeks to predict, and the opinions of others can be treated as predictive cues. The size of the training sample corresponds to the number of options that individuals have experienced in the past. Strategies that rely on estimates of taste similarity cannot leverage the knowledge of similar others unless an individual shares enough experiences with those people so that they can accurately estimate their similarity. A comparable challenge is faced by recommender system algorithms when recommending options to new users about whom they know little to nothing (the new user cold-start problem 38 ). Strategies that rely heavily on similarity are expected to improve in performance as an individual acquires more experiences. By contrast, aggregation-heavy strategies, which place little (to no) weight on similarity, should perform well even with little experience because they do not require accurate estimates of similarity. In sum, a large pool of shared experiences between an individual and their peers should lead to better estimation of similarity and give similarity-heavy strategies an edge over aggregation-heavy strategies.
How does the mean cue-criterion correlation translate to the domain of taste? The mean correlation between an individual and their peers (that is, the mean taste similarity) corresponds to the mean cue-criterion correlation in matters of fact problems (see also ref. 12 ). Depending on people's mean taste similarity, the relevance of mis-estimating similarity will vary widely across a population. For people who are, on average, a lot like their peers (that is, have mainstream tastes), strategies that aggregate the opinions of many different peers can be expected to perform quite well, even when experience is limited (see [39] [40] [41] ). By contrast, people with alternative tastes (that is, a mean taste similarity of < 0) will perform worse than chance by unconditionally following the whole crowd's opinion; they can be expected to benefit considerably from finding and relying on just a few similar others. Take the best 89 and single attribute 30 Imitate the best and best member 90, 91 Nearest neighbours (k = s = 1) Whole crowd 11, 12 Average the evaluations of all N other individuals (that is, go with the mainstream)
Equal/unit weights Average the evaluations of the k most similar individuals
Select crowd 25 and expert crowd 36 Nearest neighbours (1 < k < N) 92 
Similar crowd
Average the evaluations of all k individuals whose taste is correlated with yours above a similarity threshold t
Similarity-weighted crowd
Weight the evaluations of all N individuals according to their similarity to your taste
Weighted average 40, 93 Weighted crowd 35 Weighted neighbours 94 Similar options Find the k most similar options to the target (that is, with similar evaluation profiles across people) and weight your own evaluations of them according to their similarity
Exemplar models [95] [96] [97] and nearest neighbour models Random copying 101 Occasionally used as a benchmark strategy
All strategies first estimate the expected utility û i (that is, enjoyment) of each option i and then select the option with the highest estimated utility; when several options have the same estimated utility, one of the tied options is chosen at random. All the strategies use the Pearson correlation coefficient (w) as a measure of similarity of taste between two individuals i and j, or two items k and l. '− ' denotes that we could not find examples for that combination of strategy and research stream in the literature.
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For all strategies that rely on similarity, the dispersion in the predictive power of the cues is also crucial 25, 42 . Even if the mean predictive power of cues is low, one cue or several cues might still be of appreciably higher quality than the others and might capture most of the predictive information in a problem. In the context of matters of taste, such dispersion in taste similarity can be operationalized as, for example, the standard deviation of the similarity correlations between an individual and everybody else. Individuals with low dispersion in taste similarity can reap only limited benefits from using similarity-heavy strategies and correctly estimating similarity. For them, any weighting scheme will work equally well (see 39, 40 ). By contrast, people with higher dispersion in taste similarity can profit much more by correctly estimating similarity. For them, assigning the right weights to the right people is crucial. Individuals with low or negative mean taste similarity with others and high dispersion in taste similarity can be expected to benefit the most by correctly assigning weights to other people or by finding a few very similar individuals.
Having established the connection between predicting matters of fact and matters of taste, we can derive predictions about when specific social learning strategies for matters of taste can be expected to perform well. Strategies that rely on the estimation of similarity information should perform better as the level of experience increases, whereas strategies that ignore similarity information should have an edge when individuals have little experience in a domain. Yet, the level of experience at which people will benefit from switching from aggregation-heavy strategies to similarity-based strategies can be expected to vary considerably depending on their mean taste similarity and the dispersion in taste similarity. For individuals with low mean taste similarity and high dispersion in taste similarity, we expect that little experience is needed before similarity-heavy strategies start outperforming aggregation-heavy strategies. By contrast, for individuals with a high mean taste similarity and low dispersion in taste similarity, we expect that more experience is required before similarity-heavy strategies start outperforming aggregation-heavy strategies.
We investigated the performance of the different social learning strategies (Table 2 ) using 14,000 people's ratings of 100 jokes from the Jester dataset (see Methods) 43 . This large-scale empirical dataset has been widely used by the recommender systems community as a benchmark dataset 43 . We treat each individual as a unique prediction environment, in which a given individual's rating is the ground truth to be predicted by their peers' ratings. Using such a large data set allowed us to study the principles underlying the success of different social learning strategies at a very large scale 44, 45 . To test our predictions on how the amount of shared experience influences the strategies' performance, we experimentally varied the number of evaluations used for each of the simulated decision-makers (that is, the number of options that were previously experienced and rated in that domain; for example, the number of rows in Table 1 ). As simulated experience increases, the strategies that rely on similarity could therefore base their similarity estimates on more data. Furthermore, the social network from which a person can leverage vicarious experience is probably much smaller than the thousands of people available in typical recommender system datasets. The cognitive limit of the number of stable relationships that people can maintain is estimated to be around 250 (ref. 46 ). To mirror this real-world feature, we opted to simulate small 'communities' of 250 members each (as opposed to letting decision-makers have access to all other individuals in the population). In the Supplementary Material, we present variations on the main simulation in which the community size is much smaller (25 members) or equals the entire population (all 14,000 participants). For all three community sizes, the patterns of results are qualitatively similar and lead to the same conclusions.
results
How does the performance of strategies change as experience increases? The performance of a strategy is defined as the proportion of correct predictions in all the paired comparisons generated in the test set and averaged over repetitions of the simulation (see Methods). Although strategies that use a combination of similarity and aggregation perform best when decision-makers have jointly experienced many options (Fig. 1a) , this is not the case at low levels of shared experience. For the lowest levels of experience, following either the whole crowd or a similar crowd is the best performing strategy. Following a similarity-weighted crowd or a clique strategy starts to outperform the whole crowd strategy, which aggregates opinions unconditionally, only after approximately 15 options have been experienced. The similarityweighted crowd strategy outperforms the similar crowd strategy after approximately 20 options; the clique strategy needs to experience 35 options to do so. These aggregate results are corroborated by individual-level analyses (that is, the proportion of decisionmakers for whom a strategy performed best; Fig. 1b) . At the lowest level of shared experience, the aggregation strategies perform best for more than four-fifths of the population. As decision-makers become more acquainted with their peers' tastes, the proportion of the population for which these strategies perform best wanes. At the highest level of experience, they perform best for only 10% of the population. Overall, the performance of strategies that rely heavily on similarity improves markedly as experience increases, whereas strategies that rely more on aggregation (and less on similarity) start out at high performance levels-even with little (or no) experience-but improve only little, if at all. Qualitatively similar results are also obtained in variations of the simulation setup (for example, when varying the size of the community of peers or the average number of items experienced in the population; see Supplementary Figs . 4a and 5a).
The informational value of less similar others. Decision-makers who have not yet experienced many options are well advised to simply aggregate the evaluations of individuals who seem to have at least minimally similar (that is, positively correlated) tastes (similar crowd) or even to unconditionally aggregate the evaluations of all individuals (whole crowd; Fig. 1 ). Although the opinions of truly similar individuals are more informative than those of truly dissimilar individuals, relying more on seemingly similar individuals is only beneficial to the extent that the similarity estimates are accurate enough. When experience is limited, estimates of similarity are apparently often not accurate enough to be of much-or any-use. The doppelgänger strategy (that is, relying solely on the most similar person) does not perform that well because of the difficulty of reliably estimating similaritybased on limited experience. Mirroring results from research on the wisdom of small crowds 25, 36 , our findings showed that taking into account additional-although less similar-peers and averaging their recommendations markedly improves performance. This point can be seen in the clique strategy, where the number of peers (k) whose evaluations are averaged determines how selectively or broadly this strategy relies on similarity. In the results presented in Fig. 1 , k was fixed at 10. Additional simulations that varied the value of k showed that with little experience, it is better to rely on large cliques (approximately 100), whereas with the highest level of experience, performance peaks with moderately sized cliques (approximately 30; see Supplementary Fig. 7 ).
Interindividual variability in tastes. So far, we have examined how strategies perform irrespective of the interindividual differences in how people's tastes correlate with those of other people. Yet, as outlined in the previous section, the cost of mis-estimating similarity can be expected to be largest for people whose tastes differ NaTUre HUMaN BeHaviOUr markedly from their peers' average tastes and whose peers differ considerably among themselves in how similar they are to the target person. To investigate the relationship between the statistical structure of taste and the strategies' performance, for each of the 14,000 individuals, we calculated the mean and standard deviation of their taste correlations with all 13,999 potential peers, indicating the average similarity with their peers and the dispersion in those taste similarities, respectively. The overall average similarity and dispersion were μ = 0.11 and σ = 0.13, respectively, which indicates a relatively low level of shared taste in the population. By statistical necessity, the tastes of the majority of people are positively correlated with those of other individuals; yet, a sizeable minority of individuals have neutral-or even antithetical-tastes when compared to the mean evaluations of the entire population (as reflected by near zero or negative mean correlations; see Fig. 2 ). On both sides of this spectrum, we can observe individuals with both high and low dispersion of taste similarity across peers (as indicated by their standard deviations). To put the observed values in context, we can contrast them with those of two idealized, synthetic individuals. First, a perfectly mainstream individual whose tastes are identical to the predictions of the whole crowd (that is, whose evaluation of each joke is identical to the average evaluation across all participants) would have a mean taste similarity of 0.33 and a dispersion of 0.18. Second, an idiosyncratic individual whose appreciation of the jokes is random (that is, sampled from uniform distributions covering the whole range of the evaluation scale) would have a mean taste similarity of 0 and a dispersion of 0.08. This comparison shows that people differ markedly in how similar their tastes are to those of their peers and that every individual therefore represents a unique environment for contrasting the performance of the social learning strategies.
Interindividual differences in strategy performance. Figure 2 shows how well the strategies perform for individuals with different tastes, ranging from mainstream to alternative, and with different dispersions in taste similarity. For illustration, we focus on the level of experience at which the best-performing similarity-heavy strategies and the aggregation-heavy strategies perform similarly well (approximately 25 options; see Fig. 1 ) and highlight the interaction between the mean taste similarity and the dispersion in taste similarity (for results at other levels of experience, see Supplementary Fig. 9 ). First, as expected, all strategies perform best for individuals with a high mean taste similarity. The whole crowd strategy correctly predicts more than 70% of the choices for individuals with a high mean taste similarity but performs worse than chance for individuals with alternative tastes. Crucially, for all strategies that rely on similarity to some extent, this result is moderated by dispersion in taste similarity, as comparing two individuals with the same mean similarity shows (see Fig. 2 ): as we move towards lower mean similarity, the losses in predictive ability are smaller for individuals with a high (as compared to low) dispersion in taste similarity with their peers. This result is modest for the similar crowd strategy, which only excludes dissimilar individuals, and for the doppelgänger strategy, which relies on only the most similar individual, but it is particularly pronounced for the similarity-weighted crowd and clique strategies, where the differences in performance are as big as 10 percentage points (to verify this, follow a vertical line from bottom to top in Fig. 2 ). Figure 3 shows the best-performing strategy for each individual for three levels of experience: people who are relatively inexperienced (10 experiences), moderately experienced (25 experiences) or who have experienced all options in the training set (75 experiences). Among the inexperienced decision-makers, the aggregation strategies perform best for almost all individuals with a positive mean taste similarity (between the two aggregationheavy strategies, the whole crowd strategy has an edge for individuals with a high mean taste similarity and a low dispersion in taste similarity). The strategies that rely on similarity perform ,000 participants (y axis) as experience increases (that is, the number of jokes simulated that decision-makers experienced and evaluated; x axis). The strategies are grouped by colour into those that primarily rely on aggregation (blue), those that primarily rely on similarity (red) and three benchmark strategies; that is, the random other strategy (see also Table 2 ), a joke length strategy, which uses the length of the joke to infer its quality, and the similar options strategy, which corresponds to an item-item collaborative filtering algorithm and uses people's ratings for the k most similar options as a proxy to decide which of the two unevaluated options to choose (see also Table 2 ). The random other strategy predicted approximately 54% of pairs correctly, which indicates that there is a small shared sense of humour in the population (that is, slightly better than chance; see also Supplementary Fig. 7) . b, The percentage of simulated decision-makers for whom each strategy performed best (y axis) as a function of the number of options experienced (x axis). The doppelgänger and random other strategies are barely visible because they almost never performed best for any participant at any level of experience.
Which strategies performed best for different individuals?
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best only for individuals with alternative or neutral taste similarity and a high dispersion in taste similarity. The pattern of results for moderately experienced decision-makers is very different. Here, aggregation-heavy strategies outperform similarityheavy strategies only for individuals with a positive mean taste similarity and a low dispersion in taste similarity. The similarityweighted crowd strategy performs best for individuals with a high dispersion in taste similarity, whereas the clique strategy performs best for individuals with a low or negative mean taste similarity and a low dispersion in taste similarity. At high levels of experience, the similarity-heavy strategies take over most of the occupied parameter space. The whole crowd and similar crowd strategies still perform best only for individuals with a high positive mean taste similarity and a very low dispersion in taste similarity. Supplementary Fig. 8 shows detailed learning curves for six prototypical individuals, illustrating different regions of the taste spectrum.
Discussion
Whether it is a matter of which massive open online course to enrol in, which music album to stream or which clothes to buy for the next summer season, most decisions made in everyday life are about matters of taste. There is no unanimous verdict on whether Cornell University offers a better statistics course than Columbia University or on whether John Coltrane's Giant Steps album is better than David Bowie's Station to Station-not to mention clothing styles 47 . In this article, we set out to understand why some social learning strategies might work for some people but not for others. We show that an individual's past experiences and the way their tastes relate to those of others interact and jointly determine the effectiveness of different social learning strategies.
With increasing experience in the domain, the predictive ability of all the best-performing strategies increased-except for the strategy that relies on the wisdom of the whole crowd, which unconditionally averages across all people and is, by design, unaffected by the increasing accuracy of the similarity estimates. All strategies lie on a bias-variance continuum (see the Supplementary Material for detailed results and an extended discussion of the bias-variance trade-off that corroborate the claims we make below; Supplementary  Figs. 11 and 12) . At one extreme, the whole crowd strategy assumes that everybody has the same taste and performs well for individuals whose tastes are indeed well aligned with those of other people. From a bias-variance trade-off perspective 31, [48] [49] [50] , this strategy suffers from potentially high bias, especially for people with alternative tastes, but it exhibits zero variance in its prediction error because it does not estimate any free parameters and makes the same prediction regardless of the past experiences an individual has acquired. By contrast, strategies that rely on similarity have a comparatively low bias because they can adapt to the homogeneity or heterogeneity of tastes in the population. However, they potentially suffer from variance because their predictions depend on the training sample used to estimate similarity, but relying on any-possibly unrepresentativesample can lead to over-fitting. At the other extreme of the biasvariance continuum is the strategy of adopting the evaluations of only the seemingly most similar person. This strategy potentially allows people to profit from the experiences of their taste doppelgän-ger and has the lowest bias, but it is the most reliant on an accurate estimation of similarity and therefore the most vulnerable to variance.
Each individual in our study is faced with a unique prediction environment (see Supplementary Fig. 13 ), amounting to 14,000 distinct prediction environments. For comparison, the largest testbeds of unique prediction environments for factual problems with 
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informational and social cues contain 63 and 90 environments, respectively 25, 33 . The statistical structure of the problem that each individual faces is determined by how their preferences relate to those of other people. Some people's tastes are very similar to those of their peers; others have opposing preferences, whereas at both ends of this spectrum, people's taste similarity with other people can be more or less dispersed, leading to very different bias-variance profiles. Our approach indicates that social learning strategies, as well as recommendation algorithms, should be evaluated at the individual level, rather than at the aggregate level, which thus far has been the common practice when evaluating recommendation algorithms. Furthermore, our individual-level bias-variance results emphasize the importance of accounting for the differing flexibility of social learning strategies with respect to how well they can tune themselves to past experiences for each person and how this flexibility is then revealed in the bias-variance trade-off. To this end, modellers can use model selection techniques (such as cross-validation 51 , structural risk minimization 52 or information criteria [53] [54] [55] [56] ) on the individual level.
To what extent were our predictions about the absolute and relative performance of various social learning strategies for different individuals borne out, and how do our findings differ from those of studies investigating strategies for matters of fact? Several similarities and differences stand out. First, we found that, when experience is scant, strategies that heavily rely on averaging performed best for all individuals with a positive mean taste correlation with the crowd. This finding is in line with results on matters of fact showing that, for small sample sizes, equal weighting of cues outperforms differential weighting models 29, 30 . The similarity-weighted crowd, which was the best-performing similarity-heavy strategy, started to outperform averaging strategies once people had acquired some experience. Yet, the exact amount of experience depended both on the mean taste similarity between an individual and the others and on the dispersion in those taste similarities; for people with a high mean taste similarity and a low dispersion this never happened (see Supplementary Fig. 2 ).
The clique strategy, which averages the evaluations of the ten most similar individuals, was consistently among the best-performing strategies for experienced individuals; this result was also replicated in much smaller or larger communities of individuals (see Supplementary Figs. 5b and 6b ). For individuals with mainstream taste, several dozen experiences were required for the clique strategy to outperform aggregation-heavy strategies, such as the similar crowd strategy (see Supplementary Figs. 2d and 3c,d) . Overall, our results corroborate findings on the potential of select crowds to solve prediction problems 25, 36 . However, our findings also show that, in the domain of taste, much more experience might be required for the potential of small crowds to be realized.
Studies that investigate environments with only a small number of cues, either informational or social, have shown that the strategy of relying on just the most predictive cue can perform on par with strategies that combine multiple cues 11, 29, 30 . In our study, the doppelgänger strategy performed better than the whole crowd strategy for a large proportion of experienced individuals, but the doppelgänger strategy was almost always dominated by the clique and the similarity-weighted crowd strategies (for some comparisons with other strategies, see Supplementary Fig. 2 ; see also ref. 25 ). It has been argued that the commonly observed superior performance of cue-based heuristic strategies, which rely on a few pieces of information or ignore cue weights, can be attributed to their lower variance relative to more-complex strategies 31 . Indeed, this was the case for the people for whom the whole crowd strategy performed best (that is, a strategy ignoring cue weights). By contrast, it did not hold for the few people for whom the single-cue strategy for predicting matters of taste (doppelgänger) performed best. This strategy had the highest variance for almost every individual in the population (see Supplementary Fig. 13 ).
In most domains of everyday experience, people (and machines) have access to information beyond their own and other people's past experiences: informational cues describing options (that is, features such as a movie's genre) and other individuals (for example, a person's clothing style or personality). The use of such information has been examined extensively in multiple-cue judgement and categorization learning in cognitive science, in content-based and demographic-based/personality-based recommender systems 2, [57] [58] [59] [60] and, more generally, in supervised learning in machine learning. People may use these cues to take advantage of the predictive information in the option's features (for example, it is a superhero movie) or to improve their assessment of similarities with their peers (for example, by considering their age, gender, personality, profession or social network) 7, 10, 11, 61, 62 . Information that goes beyond shared experiences might be particularly beneficial when people make their first choices in a domain that is new to their network-for example, when looking for a restaurant in a city they have never 
visited before. In such situations, when they lack shared experiences with similar others, using the option's cues to predict its quality directly or using cues characterizing another person (for example, clothing) to assess similarity could prove beneficial. But how do people learn from others when they have access to more than one type of information or model? Both the recommender system literature and the psychological literature on inferences about matters of fact are rife with ideas on how to combine different sources of information or models [63] [64] [65] [66] [67] . In the recommender systems context, a well-known example of aggregating different sources of information and approaches is the Netflix competition, in which the winning model was a hybrid of several best-performing models 68 . People, by analogy, could regard learning from similar others and learning from the features of the objects as two modules that operate independently and can be aggregated or used in a complementary manner when a judgement needs to be made. The study of the theoretical performance of hybrid decision strategies and their prescriptive and descriptive value as models of social learning for matters of taste are fruitful avenues for future research. A recent intriguing study 12 has made inroads in that direction by examining whether people could benefit from combining their own predictions about whether they will like an option (on the basis of prior information about the available options) with the predictions of a crowd of other people. In the language of recommender systems 64 , such an approach would correspond to a hybrid model between a contentbased system, which can derive predictions based on the features of the considered options, and a collaborative system, which relies on the wisdom of similar others.
People can use the strategies investigated in this paper not only to learn about themselves but also to learn about other people's preferences. Our theory integration revealed that-from an algorithmic perspective-learning about others, as recommender systems do, and learning about oneself are equivalent problems. Instead of comparing their own taste with that of their friends, individuals can use other people's past evaluations or other sources of information to assess similarity in tastes between a target individual and other people (for example, my friend Bob has similar music tastes with John but less so with Linda). Learning what other people like is an invaluable social skill. Thus, it comes as no surprise that toddlers already have an awareness of other people's preferences 69 . As adults, humans learn about their friend's preferences; as parents, they learn about their children's likes and dislikes 70 , and it is important for people to know what their romantic partners like 71 . Being able to better predict other individuals' tastes can lead to better advice (for example, recommending a restaurant) and better surrogate choices when picking an option on their behalf (such as choosing a dish at a restaurant) 72 . Tapping into people's knowledge of the preferences of their friends or partners, a few studies have compared the prediction performance of human recommenders with that of actual recommender systems [73] [74] [75] . The results have been inconclusive so far, suggesting that, in some contexts, humans provide better recommendations than algorithms, but in other contexts, recommender systems outperform humans. In addition to prediction comparisons, future research could characterize human and artificial recommenders in terms of comparable formal learning strategies. This may help to clarify the informational or computational advantages that give an edge to humans or machines. From Thurstone's discrimination theory 76 to Rosenblatt's perceptron 77 , psychological theories have often influenced the development of new statistical and predictive tools. Inversely, statistical tools, such as regression analysis and signal detection theory, have inspired the development of new psychological theories 78, 79 . Somewhat surprisingly, early work on the wisdom of crowds and opinion aggregation in psychology [80] [81] [82] seems to have gone unnoticed by recommender system researchers, although the first algorithms they developed were very similar to these strategies in both spirit and content. Likewise, insights emerging from recommender system research in the past two decades have not really been incorporated back into psychology and the behavioural sciences more generally, although the recommender systems community has maintained a general interest in using insights from the behavioural sciences 83, 84 (and many recommender system researchers suggest that the origins of recommender system research can be traced back to cognitive science 85 ). It is a historical vagary that cognitive psychologists and behavioural scientists have not forcefully addressed the issue of individual learning from the experience of similar others given that they have developed very similar models in the domain of facts.
A key reason for the divergence between these two strands of research is the lack of large-scale datasets that are amenable to studying interindividual differences. The recommender datasets leveraged in industrial applications (for example, Netflix, Last.fm or Pandora) or developed under the auspices of research institutions (such as MovieLens) are typically very sparse. Even the most prolific users have evaluated only a small subset of all available options and even the most popular options have been rated by only a small fraction of all users. As a result, researchers have to deal with the substantive challenges introduced by missing data (for example, by adding values artificially to the matrix 86 or introducing algorithms that cope with missing data and selection biases 87 ) and comparisons between individuals become cumbersome. In this paper, we used the only full large-scale recommender dataset known to us (that is, with a substantial number of items evaluated by every individual in the population). Additional full datasets from other domains of experience could facilitate cross-fertilization between behavioural scientists and the recommender systems community. Future dialogue between these disciplines is crucial for understanding the social learning strategies that individuals can use to harvest other people's experiences and therefore inform their own choices in matters of taste.
It is often said that there is no arguing about taste. Nevertheless, we have shown that the social learning strategy for matters of taste that works best for each individual is not subjective-rather, it is subject to rational argumentation.
Methods
The Jester dataset was created by an online recommender system that allowed Internet users to read and rate jokes on a scale ranging from not funny (− 10) to funny (+ 10). We used the participants' funniness ratings both as criterion values and to estimate similarity between individuals. For a recent version of the interface and more information on the dataset visit http://eigentaste.berkeley.edu.
For simplicity, we only used the data of participants who evaluated all jokes (reducing the number of participants from 73,421 to 14,116). We randomly selected 14,000 participants in order to be able to partition them into evenly sized communities of 250 members each. We used the Pearson correlation coefficient as a measure of similarity between two individuals or two items 88 where similarity between two individuals i and j is defined as̄̄∑
For the similar options strategy, similarity is calculated using the Pearson correlation coefficient but between two items k and l. M stands for the total number of options or people and n for specific options or people. We chose to adopt the Pearson correlation as the measure of similarity so that we could better connect our results to the recommender system literature, in which it is the canonical measure of similarity. In each simulation run, we performed the following steps:
1. From the 14,000 individuals, we randomly generated 56 communities with 250 members each (14,000/250). 2. We randomly divided the jokes into a training set (x jokes) and a test set (25 jokes); this assignment was the same for all individuals within a particular community but differed across communities. For each individual within each community, the different social learning strategies were fitted to the training set, assuming that individuals could only access the ratings of their peers within their own community. 3. For each individual (within each community), we generated all 300 possible paired comparisons within the test set (K × (K − 1)÷ 2, where K stands for NaTUre HUMaN BeHaviOUr the number of items in the test set). For each strategy, we recorded which of the two jokes in a pair the strategy predicted would be rated higher by that individual. In the very few cases in which two jokes had exactly the same predicted or actual funniness rating, ties were broken at random. 4. For each strategy and level of experience (x = 5, 10 … 70, 75), we recorded the performance of each strategy, that is, its proportion of correct predictions across the 300 paired comparisons for each individual. Formally, performance can be expressed as C/(K × (K − 1)÷ 2), where C stands for the number of correct predictions.
This procedure was repeated 1,000 times. It yielded 300,000 paired comparisons per individual (300 × 1,000), 75,000,000 paired comparisons per community (300 × 250 × 1,000) and 4,200,000,000 paired comparisons in total (30,000 × 250 × 56 × 1,000). To derive the final results, we averaged across the 1,000 repetitions for each combination of individual, level of experience and strategy. We identified the best-performing strategy for each individual based on the average performance of each strategy (that is, averaged across the simulation runs). Note that the same results reliably emerge already with much fewer than 1,000 simulation runs, which strongly suggests that the results obtained with 1,000 runs have converged.
We investigated how the strategies' performance changed as a function of simulated experience by repeating the procedure for different numbers (x) of jokes experienced in the training set (from 5 to 75 in steps of 5). The standard errors of the performance measure across all individuals, experience levels and strategies ranged between 0.00071 and 0.00287 with a median of 0.0015. In the Supplementary Material, we also present the results for several variations of this baseline simulation, all of which yielded similar qualitative results and the same conclusions.
Reporting Summary. Further information on experimental design is available in the Nature Research Reporting Summary linked to this article.
Code availability. The code corresponding to the simulation routines described in the paper can be accessed at https://osf.io/gscvh/. All codes were run using the R programming language.
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